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FEDERAL INCOME TAX DISCRIMINATION BETWEEN
MARRIED AND SINGLE TAXPAYERS
In an era replete with myriad complaints of discrimination, contentions
that the federal income taxation system is discriminatory are hardly sur-
prising. Most recent claims of tax discrimination have focused on tax
preferences that allow high-income taxpayers to significantly reduce or
eliminate tax payments and that are inherently unavailable to a majority
of low- and middle-income taxpayers.' A new allegation of unfair dis-
criminatory treatment in taxation has recently been voiced, however, by
certain married taxpayers and their sympathizers.2 Their claim is based
on the fact that a married couple in which both spouses work bears a
greater tax burden than two single persons with an identical total in-
come; 3 the married couple pays a larger tax bill solely because of their
marital status.
4
The recent complaints by married taxpayers are not the first allegations
of tax discrimination based on marital status. Although the roots of differ-
ential tax rates go deep into the history of the federal income tax, the
reduction of tax rates for singles included in the Tax Reform Act of
19695 precipitated these new complaints of a "marriage penalty."
This article explores the present tax rate structure and its implications,
considers the historical events and policies which created four separate
tax rates, analyzes the tax policies embodied by the different rate treat-
ment of married and single taxpayers, and examines the constitutional
problems involved in maintaining the present disparate tax treatment. An
1 See, e.g., P. STERN, THE RAPE OF THE TAXPAYER (1973); Pecham & Okner, Indi-
vidual Income Tax Erosion, in JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 92D CONG., 2D SESS., THE
ECONOMICS OF FEDERAL SUBSIDY PROGRAMS-A COMPENDIUM OF PAPERS 13-40
(Comm. Print 1972).
2 See Nussbaum, Tax Structure and Discrimination Against Working Wives, 25
NAT'L TAX J. 183 (1972); Richards, Discrimination Against Married Couples Under
Present Income Tax Laws, 49 TAXES 526 (1971); Richards, Single v. Married Income
Tax Returns Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 48 TAXES 301 (1970); Shanahan,
Tax Help for the Two-Income Family, N.Y. Times, Aug. 12, 1973, § 3, at 12, col. 3.
3 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1(a) & (c).
4 For example, two single persons with gross incomes of $20,000 and $10,000 re-
spectively in 1973 would pay a total tax bill of $5,785 ($4,255 tax on $20,000 income
plus $1,530 tax on $10,000 income), if both claimed the percentage standard deduc-
tion. If these two taxpayers were to marry each other, however, their tax liability,
again assuming the use of the percentage standard deduction, would immediately rise
to $6,560, essentially meaning a $775 "penalty" for marriage.
5 Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 803, 83 Stat. 487 (codified at INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § I (c)). For a complete listing of the Act's provisions and the
Code sections modified see U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., at
509-822 (1969).
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alternative tax rate treatment, which will avoid the discrimination inher-
ent in the present system, is suggested.
I. PRESENT DIFFERENTIAL RATE
TREATMENT OF-MARRIED AND SINGLE TAXPAYERS
The federal income tax originally imposed its burdens on an individual
basis,6 making each recipient of income totally responsible for any tax
due on his own income.7 Over the intervening years, however, various
reforms have created new taxation units and additional rate structures.8
The most significant of these reforms occurred in 1948, when Congress
extended the benefits of "income splitting"'.9 to all married couples. Be-
cause of a combination of political and economic forces, Congress made
available to married couples in all states a tax preference previously avail-
able only to couples in community property states. 10 The combination of
progressive tax rates" and -the split-income plan created a tax saving for
nearly all married couples. Only couples in which both spouses earned
identical incomes received no benefit from the split-income plan. Since
these couples' incomes were, in fact, already split, the couples continued
paying tax at the higher singles' rates.
After this reform, Congress was confronted by those who could not
make use of the split-income plan because of their single status. Single
persons claimed that the plan gave too great an advantage to married
couples. In 1969, Congress responded by reducing singles' tax rates. This
action resulted in fairer tax treatment of single taxpayers, but no relief
was granted to two-earner married couples. As a result, married couples
in which both earn income now pay higher rates than any other taxpayer
group.
12
Because of the 1969 reduction in singles' tax rates, income-splitting
now benefits only couples in which one spouse works or in which the
disparity between the two spouses' incomes is large enough to force the
couple's income, once aggregated and split, into a tax rate bracket lower
than that for two single persons with identical incomes. If both individuals
work, the advantage of income-splitting diminishes as the lower-paid
spouse's income increases and consequently the tax "reduction" below
singles' rates decreases. Additional tax is imposed as interspousal income
parity is approached. The tax "penalty" on marriage is greatest where
6 Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(a)(1) & (2), 38 Stat. 166-81.
7 Id.
8 See part II infra.
9 Income-splitting allows a married couple to aggregate the income of both spouses,
halve this figure, and then have each be taxed, as married individuals filing separa-
tely, on half of the total income. Because of the progressive rate schedules, splitting
the couple's total income evenly allows a tax saving in some cases.
10 See part II B infra.
11 See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1. Progressive rates are based on the theory that
persons with larger incomes have a greater ability to pay.
12 J. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLIcY 88 (rev. ed. 1971).
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there is income equality between spouses. Figure 1 presents, for various
income levels, the amounts of additional tax imposed on two people as a
result of marriage.
While the marriage penalty is greatest for couples with equal incomes,
many other income combinations also result in higher taxes for two-earner
married couples than two singles with identical incomes would pay. Fig-
Figure 1
MARRIAGE PENALTY*
Tax on two persons electing either
the low income allowance or optional standard deduction
(No itemized deductions)
Adjusted Gross Percentage Increase
Income of Marriage in Tax Resulting From





































1954, § 1(a) & (c).
*The relatively large amount of marriage penalty at low-income levels is largely
the result of the Internal Revenue Code provisions pertaining to the percentage
standard deduction and low-income allowance. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 141. Since
a single individual is entitled to a standard deduction equal to that of a married couple,
two single individuals, each taking the standard deduction, can earn a larger amount
before having to pay tax than can two married individuals earning identical amounts.
For example, for a single individual claiming the $1,300 low income allowance, the
first $2,050 of income is exempted from tax ($1,300 low income allowance plus $750
personal exemption). Thus, two single taxpayers could evenly split $4,100 of income
and pay no tax. If these two were to marry, however, they would lose the use of one
low income allowance, thereby subjecting $1,300 to the higher two-income married
rates, which results in a tax liability of $185. The combination of higher rates and loss
of one standard deduction penalizes marriage for most low- and medium-income
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ure 2 graphically shows the tax penalty on marriage at various low- and
middle-income levels and relative-income combinations. As can be seen
from this graphic representation of the marriage penalty, almost any earn-
ings by the spouse of a wage earner eliminates the advantage of income-
splitting and results in higher taxes for the couple because of their marriage.
Recognizing the implications of this increased tax burden on working cou-
Figure 2
MARRIAGE PENALTY AT VARIOUS INCOME LEVELS*:




Male A djusted Gross Income
(x$1000)
From INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1 (a) & (c).
INSTRUCTIONS FOR USE: To find the approximate amount of the marriage
penalty at a given income combination, locate the point on the graph representing
the intersection of the adjusted gross incomes of the male and female taxpayers. The
amount of the marriage penalty is shown by the amounts associated with the isopleth
lines of increased tax resulting from marriage. A negative number indicates a tax
saving for the married couple resulting from the use of income-splitting.
*The form of the graph is based on a similar analysis in White, The Tax Structure




ples, various authors have criticized the present tax laws as discouraging
marriage, encouraging cohabitation, and discriminating against married
women who wish to work.
13
II. HISTORY OF TAX DISCRIMINATION
BASED ON MARITAL STATUS
A. Geographic Inequality
When the Revenue Act of 1913 was enacted1 4 there was only one
rate schedule; 15 the individual was the sole taxation unit'6 and each
taxpayer was taxed on his own earned income. 17 Because the rate struc-
ture was progressive,"8 taxpayers with large incomes who could shift
their income to other family members benefited if each family member
filed an individual return. This device enabled the family to claim several
personal exemptions and to have family income taxed at lower rates than
it would have been if only one return was filed on the entire amount. Thus,
income-shifting produced the lowest possible tax on the family's total in-
come. 19
This shifting of income was simple with unearned income-income aris-
ing from the ownership of property-since title to the property could be
actually transferred to another family member. 20 Attempts to shift un-
earned income without formal transfer of title2'l and attempts to shift
earned income,22 however, came under government scrutiny.
Much of the controversy concerning the validity of earned-income-
shifting devices stemmed from the variation in treatment of marital prop-
erty by different states. A majority of state property laws were based on
the English common law system, which predicated ownership on taking an
active role in acquiring income or property, but eight southern and west-
ern states 231 had marital property laws based on the Spanish or French
13 See Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of
Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 49 (1971); Cooper, Working Wives
and the Tax Law, 25 RUTGERS L. REv. 67 (1970); Nussbaum, supra note 2; Richards,
Discrimination Against Married Couples Under Present Income Tax Laws, supra
note 2; White, The Tax Structure and Discrimination Against Working Wives: A
Comment, 26 NAT'L TAX J. 119 (1973).
14 Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 166-81.
15 Id. § II(A)(1) & (2).
16 Id.
17 Id.
i8 The rate scale ranged from I percent of the first $20,000 of taxable income to 7
percent of taxable income in excess of $500,000. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16,
§ II(A)(1) & (2), 38 Stat. 166-81.
19 For example, a taxpayer with $250,000 of taxable income and a wife and child
could have decreased his tax liability for the year 1915 from $13,850 to $7,290 by
making use of a three-way income split.
20 See Blair v. Comm'r, 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
21 See Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
22 See Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
23 The original community property states were Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisi-
ana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. Hearings on Community Property
and Family Partnerships Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 834 (1947) (statement of Wesley Disney).
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community property systems, which gave each spouse a half share of any
property or income acquired by either spouse after marriage. Thus, com-
munity property states mandated a tax-saving equal split of marital in-
come, while most states attribued income solely to the spouse who
earned it.
The federal Treasury acquiesced in the states' determination of title
to income for tax purposes. In 1921, the Attorney General determined
that husbands and wives could each report half of all community property
income on individual tax returns in all community property states in
which a spouse's interest vested when the income was earned. 24 Attempts
by families in common law states to achieve a similar effect through con-
tractual arrangements were disapproved by the Supreme Court in 1930
in Lucas v. Earl,25 which declared that income was to be taxed to the
one who earned it.26 In spite of this rule, the Court validated inter-
spousal income-splitting for tax purposes in community property states
later in the same year in Poe v. Seaborn2 7 and a series of related deci-
sions.28s Since no state law operated to split earned income between
spouses in common law states, the tax treatment accorded married tax-
payers living in community property states differed greatly from that ac-
corded married taxpayers earning the same income in common law states.
24 32 Op. Arr''Y GEN. 298, 435 (1920-21).
25 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
26 The Court interpreted the Internal Revenue Code to:
[T]ax salaries to those who earned them and provide that the tax
could not be escaped by anticipatory arrangements and contracts how-
ever'skillfully devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting
even for a second in the man who earned it.
281 U.S. at 114-15.
27 282 U.S. 101 (1930). Seaborn involved construction of the Code. The Court
held that absent some further congressional guidance, a state's property laws must
control in determining what constitutes individual income.
The case requires us to construe Sections 210(a) and 211(a) of the
Revenue Act of 1926 (U.S.C. App., tit. 26 §§ 951 and 952), and
apply them, as construed, to the interests of husband and wife in
community property under the law of Washington. These sections lay
a tax upon the net income of every individual. The Act goes no farther,
and furnishes no other standard or definition of what constitutes an
individual's income. The use of the word "of' denotes ownership. It
would be a strained construction, which, in the absence of further
definition by Congress, should impute a broader significance to the
phrase.
The Commi-ssioner concedes that the answer to the question involved
in the cause must be found in the provisions of the law of the State,
as to a wife's ownership of or interest in community property.
282 U.S. at 109-10 (footnote omitted).
28 For other Supreme Court decisions concerning the validity of income-splitting in
community property states see Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930) (Arizona);
Hopkins v. Bacon, 282 U.S. 122 (1930) (Texas); Bender v. Pfaff, 282 U.S. 127
(1930) (Louisiana); and United States v. Malcolm, 282 U.S. 792 (1930) (California).
In each of these cases, the Court concluded that in a community property state one-half
of all income vested in each spouse at the time the income accrued.
[VOL. 7:667
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The resultant discrimination was slight, however, because of the relatively
low tax rates prevailing at the time of the Seaborn decision. 29
The low federal income tax rates could not generate enough income to
offset the expenditure burdens placed on the federal Treasury by the
Depression and World War II. Therefore, the tax base was enlarged and
tax rates were increased sharply. 30 This change in the tax law made the
advantages to married taxpayers in community property states both signif-
icant and conspicuous. Consequently, the legislatures of several common
law states, recognizing the comparative advantages enjoyed by residents of
community property states, enacted community property legislation in an
attempt to extend those same advantages to their own constituents. 31 The
wholesale disruption of local property laws which accompanied these
change-overs and the prospect of many more states making the same
switch prompted swift action by Congress in 1948.32
B. The Congressional Response
Prior to 1948, several proposals designed to eliminate the advantage
gained from income-splitting by married couples in community property
states were placed before Congress.33 The number and variety of these
29 The Revenue Act of 1928 taxed the net income ("net income" was equivalent to
present-day "taxable income") of every individual at a rate equal to the sum of: (I)
112 percent of the first $4,000 of the amount of net income in excess of allowable
credits; (2) 3 percent cf the next $4,000 of such an excess; and (3) 5 percent of the
remainder of such excess. Revenue Act of 1928, ch. 852, § 11, 45 Stat. 791.
30For example, a married taxpayer with two dependents and an adjusted gross
income of $15,000 would have paid $831 in tax in 1939. By 1943, his tax bill would
have been $4,265, an increase of more than 500 percent. Hearingi on H.R. 4790
Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1948) (testimony of
John Hanes).
31 For a brief overview of state actions toward adopting community property
legislation in the period 1939-1947 see B. BITTKER & L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME,
ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 345 (1972). For a fuller explication of the spread of
community property laws see Polisher, The Recent Trend Toward Community
Property-Its Federal Income, Gilt, and Estate Tax Implications, N.Y.U. 6TH ANN.
INST. ON FED. TAX 1105 (1948).
32 Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, § 301, 53 Stat. 5, 17. See also Hearings on
Community Property and Family Partnerships Before the House Ways and Means
Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 886 (1947) (testimony of Rep. Albert Reeves);
S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1948).
33 The proposals included:
1) A mandatory joint return provision, which would have required aggregation of
all the income of both spouses so that division of income between spouses would
cease to be a factor in determining their total tax liability. Married couples with the
same income would therefore pay equal taxes in every state. The married couple
would become an independent taxation unit. These mandatory joint returns would
have resulted in increased tax burdens for married taxpayers, who would be forced
into a higher rate bracket by aggregation than would have been imposed on them
separately if division was allowed.
2) A dual rate schedule, which would have equalized the amount paid by married
couples filing separately and those filing jointly by retaining the current rate schedule
for those filing jointly and creating a new individual rate schedule with tax brackets
only half as wide as those in the joint return. This scheme would have eliminated any
SPIUNG 1974]
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proposals 34 suggest that difficulty in selecting the means of achieving
equalization of treatment, and not doubt concerning the desirability of
equalization, constituted the major obstacle to congressional action prior
to 1948.
The need for action culminated in the first session of the Eightienth
Congress. During extensive debates in the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee and the Senate Finance Committee on the best means of attaining
geographic equality of treatment of married taxpayers, 35 mandatory joint
return and "management and control" proposals were rejected as polit-
ically unfeasible.3 6 Despite recognition that it was not a complete solution
advantage from filing separate returns on split income, but would also have greatly
increased the relative tax burden on single taxpayers.
3) A legislative repeal of the advantage granted to married couples in community
property states by Seaborn, which would have required that all earned income be
taxed to the earner (under the doctrine of Lucas v. Earl) and all unearned income be
taxed to the person exercising management and control over the income. This pro-
posal would have eliminated the advantage gained through automatic income-splitting
between community property spouses, and their taxes would have been brought back
into parity with the taxes paid by all other taxpayers.
4) A universalization of income-splitting. This proposal for equalizing tax burdens
was not a plan for restoration of complete equality. It contemplated extension of the
advantage of income-splitting to all married couples in all states by legislative fiat.
This would have equalized the treatment of married couples in common law and
community property states, but would have left single taxpayers with an unjustifiably
high tax burden. U.S. Treasury Dep't, The Tax Treatment of Family Income, in
Hearings on Community Property and Family Partnerships Before the House Ways
and Means Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 846, 852-66 (1947) [hereinafter cited as
Tax Treatment of Family Income].
34 In 1921, a revenue bill was proposed, and passed in the House, which would
have required that community income be included in the gross income of the spouse
exercising management and control over that income. The bill failed in the Senate.
H.R. 8245, 67th Cong., Ist Sess. § 208 (1921); S. REP. No. 486, 67th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1921). In 1924, a similar provision was proposed by the Secretary of the Treasury.
[1922-1923] SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY ANN. REP. 9. However, the provision con-
tained in the Treasury Draft of the Revenue Act of 1924 was deleted by the Ways
and Means Committee from the final draft presented to Congress. H.R. 6715, 68th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1924). Following a 1933 recommendation by the Acting Secretary
of the Treasury, the Ways and Means Committee included a provision requiring
mandatory joint returns from all married couples in the tentative draft of the Revenue
Act of 1934, but drafting difficulties forced the proposal to be dropped. Hearings on
H.R. 8396 Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1934)
(testimony of Rep. Treadway). Hearings were held in 1934 on a bill which would
have taxed community income to the spouse controlling it, but no committee action
was taken. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1934 Before the House Ways and Means
Comm., 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 112-32, 538-49 (1934). Abortive attempts to create
equality in the tax treatment of all married couples by means of mandatory joint
returns or "management and control" provisions were made in 1937, 1941, and 1942.
Tax Treatment of Family Income, supra note 33, at 853.
35 See Hearings on H.R. 4790 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-647 (1948); Hearings on H.R. 4790 Before the House Ways and Means Comm.,
80th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-264 (1948); Hearings on Community Property and Family
Partnerships Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 747-970
(1947).




to the unequal taxation problem, 37 the split-income plan was chosen by
Congress as the method of achieving geographic uniformity in taxation of
married couples.
38
In 1947, income-splitting amendments were added to two tax reduction
bills.3 ( Both bills were passed by Congress but vetoed by President
Truman, 40 who opposed any tax reduction not focused on alleviating the
plight of the low-income taxpayer. 4' In 1948, tax reduction coupled with a
split-income plan was again attempted. Repeal of the 1942 Estate and
Gift Tax Amendment 42 was included in the bill in order to gain the support
of representatives from community property states, who were initially op-
posed to the income-splitting plan. 43 With this additional support, the bill
was passed and sustained over the President's veto. 44
37 It was recognized that implementation of the split-income plan would result in
increased relative tax loads on single taxpayers and therefore would not restore
complete equality in taxation. See Tax Treatment of Family Income, supra note 33, at
852.
38 The income-splitting plan was popular both in and out of Congress. The proposal
was simple since it involved no adjustments in the rate schedule and it at least
partially satisfied the proponents of mandatory joint returns, since it called for joint
returns from all married couples wishing to split marital income. No constitutional
challenges to the split-income plan were expected, a worry which had frequently
been expressed in regard to the joint return and "management and control" proposals.
Income-splitting was also the most painless means of restoring equal tax treatment
of married couples, since it was the only proposal considered which would result in a
tax reduction rather than an increase. This last consideration was important to the
Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress, which was publicly committed to a tax
reduction. The income-splitting plan also had the active support of the American Bar
Association, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the National Association of
Manufacturers, and the Committee for Economic Development. See generally B. BIT-
TKER & L. STONE, supra note 31, at 348; H. GROVES, FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT OF THE
FAMILY 64 (1963); P. STERN, supra note 1, at 124.
39 H.R. 1, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); H.R. 3950, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).4 0 H.R. Doc. No. 322, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947); H.R. Doc. No. 407, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947).
41 See State of the Union Message to Congress by President Harry S. Truman,
U.S. CODE CONG. SERV., 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2393, 2400 (1948).4 2 Act of Oct. 21, 1942, ch. 619, 53 Stat. 121-22. The 1942 amendment substituted
economic origin of property for legal ownership as the taxability criterion. This
treatment conflicted with community property law and resulted in taxation of an
entire estate when the husband died first on the basis that his activity had created the
estate; yet if the wife died first, her share of the community property was held to be
subject to the estate tax on the theory that she had the right to make a testamentary
disposition of that property. This inconsistent treatment was extremely unpopular in
community property states. See Hearings on Community Property and Family Partner-
ships Be/ore the House Ways and Means Comm., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 837 (1947)
(Statement of Wesley Disney). See also H. GROVES, supra note 38, at 65.
43 The community property states originally attempted to block passage of the
income-splitting plan in order to retain the full advantage of income-splitting ex-
clusively for their residents. H. GROVES, supra note 38, at 65.
44 H.R. 4790, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (1948); H.R. Doc. No. 589, 80th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1948); Revenue Act of 1948, § 301, 53 Stat. 5, 17.
Once the tax advantage of community property law was removed, the "new" com-
munity property states lost little time in repealing their statutes. See Note, Epilogue to
the Community Property Scramble: Problems of Repeal, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 332-33
(1950).
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The 1947 Treasury Study of Family Income t 5 warned Congress of
the inadequacy of available data on the relative taxpaying abilities of
various tax units46 and cited the need for further research before policy
decisions concerning the proper allocation of tax burdens and identifica-
tion of tax units were made.4 7 Yet the movement for immediate equal-
ization of treatment of married persons through income-splitting had ac-
quired sufficient inertia to prevail in 1948. While adoption of any of the
other proposals for equalization 48 would have restored complete equality
in rate treatment, 49 the one incomplete solution, income-splitting, was
adopted.
In enacting universal income-splitting, Congress ostensibly sought to
restore the equality of tax treatment that had been lost when Seaborn
was decided, 50 but Congress failed to acknowledge that Seaborn had given
married couples in community property states an advantage over all other
taxpayers, not just over married couples in common law jurisdictions. Both
the Treasury Department Report5 ' and testimony before the House Ways
and Means Committee52 warned that income-splitting was not a complete
solution to the inequity problem, since it left single taxpayers, especially
those with dependents, with an unjustifiably high tax burden. The con-
gressional committee reports5 .1 did not mention this shortcoming of the
income-splitting proposal.. Faced with a situation in which a small group
was receiving favored tax treatment, Congress acted in the name of equal-
ity by treating the symptom of unequal taxation of married couples with-
out curing the underlying malady. The need for haste and for a polit-
ically expedient solution caused Congress to enact a provision which was
inadequate to forestall future claims of tax discrimination.
C. Post-1948 Adjustments
Soon after the income-splitting provision was passed, Congress began
to doubt whether the income-splitting solution was fair to the taxpayers
who could not take advantage of its provisions. Congress made a series of
rate concessions to reduce the advantages of income-splitting. These rate
reductions confirm the failure of Congress' 1948 plan to provide equality
of tax treatment.
45 Tax Treatment of Family Income, supra note 33.
4 6 Id. at 852.
47 Id.
48 The other proposals for equalization were mandatory joint returns, taxation of
income to the person exercising "management and control," and dual-rate proposals.
See note 33 supra.
49 See note 33 supra.
50 S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1948).
51 Tax Treatment of Family Income, supra note 33, at 858.
52 Hearings on Community Property and Family Partnerships Before the House
Ways and Means Commi., 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 898 (1947) (testimony of Murray
Flack).




In 1951, Congress began to mitigate the inequities of income-splitting
by establishing a special category of taxpayers called "heads of house-
holds"5 4 and allowing single .taxpayers who maintained a home for both
themselves and a dependent to pay taxes at a new rate rather than at the
high singles' tax rate.5 5 The new head-of-household tax rate schedule
was halfway between the married and single rates.
This extension of favored tax treatment to one class of single taxpayers
was only a prelude to enlargement of the favored class. The head-of-
household category was expanded in 1954 to allow single persons who
maintained a parent or parents in a separate abode to take advantage of
the reduced rates.;,5 In addition, a new "surviving spouse" category was
added to enable a decedent's spouse to use income-splitting married rates
for two years after the year in which his or her spouse died.
57
These changes resulted in a three-tiered rate schedule, with one-earner
married couples enjoying the lowest rates, followed by heads of house-
holds and then single taxpayers. Any rate advantage to a two-earner
married couple depended on the magnitude of the difference between the
spouses' income levels. If the spouses' incomes were identical, the couple
theoretically, but not actually, 8 received the same tax rate treatment
afforded to two single individuals earning the same amounts.
In 1969, Congress responded to public pressure calling for tax relief
for singles5 9 by enacting a new reduced single taxpayer rate schedule as
part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969. " Despite testimony revealing that
54 Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, § 301(a), 53 Stat. 6 (codified at INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 2(b)).
55 The situation of such a single taxpayer was much like that of a single earner in a
marriage. H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1951).
Z6 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2(b)(l)(B).
57 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ l(a), 2(a)(1).
58 Because of the loss of one optional standard deduction by the married couple
through marriage (see INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 141), the married couple could pay
a larger total tax bill. While the effective tax savings enjoyed by the parties in a two-
earner marriage could range from the full amount of savings accorded to a one-income
couple (in cases where one spouse's income was extremely low) to no effective
savings (where the spouses' incomes were equal), a married couple could not pay a
tax rate significantly higher than the rate imposed on two singles who earned the
same amounts.
59 The organized movement for reform in singles tax rates was led by the National
Association of Single Taxpayers, 1010 Vermont Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C., and
its organizer, Vivien Kellems, and by Single Persons' Tax Reform, of San Francisco,
and its President, Dorothy Shinder. Ms. Kellems, in addition to her role as organizer,
advocate, and writer for the cause of singles tax relief, instituted a private action in
the Tax Court of the United States to obtain refund of the amount "overpaid" by
herself as a single taxpayer under pre-1969 procedure on the grounds that differential
rate treatment was a denial of equal protection. Kellems v. Comm'r, 58 T.C. 556
(1972), afl'd, 474 F.2d 1399, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 831 (1973). The Tax Court
denied any refund and found the disparate treatment of married and single taxpayers
had a "rational basis"-congressional desire for geographically uniform treatment of
married couples and recognition that married persons generally have greater financial
burdens than single persons. For other, more unorthodox theories attacking
higher singles' tax rates see Shinder v. Comm'r, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1967-73, at
373 (1967); Rau v. Comm'r, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1966-254, at 1313 (1966).
60Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, § 803 (codified at INT.
REV. CODE of 1954, § l(c)).
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two-earner married couples bore at least as much of an inequitable tax
burden as did singles,61 Congress retained the pre-1969 singles' tax rate
schedule as the schedule for married -taxpayers filing separately. 62 The
result of this series of rate changes is the tax penalty on two-earner mar-
ried couples.
63
In 1948, 1951, 1954, and 1969, Congress acted in the name of tax
equality.64 Each time, Congress had the opportunity to restore full equal-
ity, yet, in each instance, Congress did no more than was immediately
necessary to halt current complaints. Prompted by a judicially and admin-
istratively imposed favored rate for one-earner married couples in com-
munity property states, Congress resolved part of the inequity by enact-
ing the most politically expedient solution. Later, faced with the patent
inequities which the ill-advised income-splitting plan had allowed to con-
tinue, Congress was gradually forced to extend favored rate -treatment to
heads of households, surviving spouses, and singles. Today, the only group
without favored rate status is two-earner married couples, but the events
of the past several decades indicate that -this heavier tax burden was never
carefully considered or even intended.65
III. POLICY IMPLICArIONS OF DIFFERENTIAL
RATE TREATMENT OF MARRIED AND SINGLE TAXPAYERS
The historical development of the current tax rate structure raises sig-
nificant doubt that the discrimination between married and single taxpay-
ers is indicative of any conscious congressional plan or policy. Rather, it
appears that the present allocation of tax burdens is the unintended and
conglomerate result of a series of ad hoc congressional reactions to public
pressure. Even if the present tax structure does reflect congressional pol-
icy, the prevailing situation can be criticized as an example of bad tax
policy.
The Internal Revenue Code's (IRC) progressive rate structure66 is
61 Hearings on H.R. 13270 Before the House Ways and Means Comnn., 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 4269 (1969) (testimony of Carl Schoup).
62 If Congress had allowed married couples to file separate returns using the new
lower singles' rate schedule, which imposes rates less than half as great as the
schedule for married couples filing jointly, married couples from community property
states could have split their income and filed separate returns, thereby reducing their
tax liability and renewing the advantage to-community property married couples.
63 See part I supra.
64 See H. GROVES, supra note 38, at 82-83 (1963); S. REP. No. 91-552, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 272 (1969); S. Rep. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 22-24 (1948); H.R.
REP. 586, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1951).
65 H. GROVES, supra note 38, at 82 (1963).
66 The IRC's present tax rate scales range from a minimum of 14 percent of the
first $500 or $1,000 of taxable income (depending on marital and household status
and filing unit) to a maximum of 50 percent of earned taxable income over $44,000
(married, joint return), $38,000 (head of household), $32,000 (single), or $22,000
(married, separate return) and 70 percent of unearned taxable income over $200,000
(married, joint return), $180,000 (head of household), or $100,000 (single and mar-
ried, separate return). INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 1, 1348.
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based on the tenet that persons with the greatest ability to pay should pay
the greatest taxY7 Yet, the imposition of the lowest tax rate on one-
earner married couples runs counter to this principle. The one-earner
married couple enjoys comparaive economic advantages over a two-
earner married couple earning the same total income. This comparative
advantage was noted by Joseph Pechman during hearings in 1959:
[D]epartures from the principle that taxpayer units with the
same taxable income should bear the same tax are likely to
create many more problems than they solve.
An exception from this generalization might be made, how-
ever, for married couples with both spouses working. Aside
from the fact that such a couple does not enjoy as much im-
puted income as it would enjoy if the wife stayed at home, it
incurs other money outlays that are directly attributable to the
wife's employment.6 5
Thus, a married couple with one income-earner is better able to bear a
given tax burden than a couple with the same income and two income-
earners, yet the IRC imposes equal tax burdens. 6 No economic justifi-
cation has ever been given for this aberration
Income-splitting violates the principle of taxation in accordance with
the taxpayer's ability to pay in another way. Calculations made by Philip
Stern indicate that the only recipients of a significant reduction in taxes as
a result of income-splitting are high-income married taxpayers.7 ° He es-
timates that more than half of the tax reduction advantages of income-
splitting are restricted to the wealthiest 8 percent of American families. 71
Thus, those married taxpayers with the greatest ability to pay receive the
largest reduction in taxes and therefore pay less tax than strict adherence
to the doctrine of ability to pay would dictate.
Furthermore, the imposition of higher relative tax burdens on married
couples in which both husband and wife work compared to the burden
imposed on one-earner married couples indicates at least a tacit congress-
ional policy that the place for one spouse is in the home. 72 Because of
67 The principle has been expressed as follows: "Forced exactions should be levied
upon various individuals with reference to their ability to pay." H.R. REP. No. 1040,
77th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1941).
68 Pechman, Income Splitting, in TAX REVISION COMPENDIUM BEFORE THE HOUsE
WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 473, 480-81 (1959).
Imputed income is the value created when a person consumes his own goods and
services. Imputed income is not taxed as real money income. For example, a woman
who remains at home and cares for a house and children will not be taxed on the
value of the services she provides. If two homemakers agreed to do each other's work
for pay, however, both would be taxed on the money income they received for doing
the same work as before in another house. See also R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX 150-51 (1964).
69 The IRC imposes equal taxes on married couples with equal taxable income, no
matter what the actual distribution of income between spouses happens to be.
70 p. STERN, supra note 1, at 119-23.
71 Id. at 125.
72 See note 13 and accompanying text supra.
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traditional role pressures and lower earning potential, the stay-at-home
spouse will almost invariaby be the wife. 73 This tax policy directly op-
poses the expressed congressional demand for equality of opportunity for
both sexes.7 4 The -tax laws should not be used to negate gains made to-
ward women's equality.
A comparative study of the tax treatment of married couples in various
countries indicates that it is desirable for a tax system to pursue a reason-
able allocation of burdens. 75 The piecemeal assignment of tax burdens
by Congress since 194876 has created a system with unsatisfactory im-
plications. The continued success of the American self-assessment system
of revenue collection is directly related to public confidence in those en-
trusted with making and administering the tax laws and public belief that
the taxes imposed are fairly allocated. 77 If the present tax system is to
survive, the IRS and Congress must move to eliminate the current tax
rate structure which is the result of shortsightedness and is fraught with
inequity.
In view of Congress' prior tax reform efforts, however, it appears that
congressional action will not be forthcoming without some prompting. A
successful attack on the constitutionality of the present disparate tax rate
structure might well provide the needed impetus.
IV. THE MARRIAGE PENALTY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION
Although the federal income tax is explicitly authorized by the six-
teenth amendment, 7s the procedure for and the substantive effects of
the collection of the tax must conform to the requirements of other con-
stitutional provisions.71 The most relevant constitutional provisions in this
T3 Blumberg, supra note 13, at 49.
74 See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, § 701, 78 Stat. 253
codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000-e2 (1965)).
75 Oldman & Temple, Comparative Analvsis of the Taxation of Married Persons,
12 STAN. L. REV. 585, 605 (1960).
76 See part II B supra.
77 See generally Pcchman, The Problem of Personal Exemptions, in TAX REVISION
COMPENDIUM BEFORE THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
380, 383-85 (1959); H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969); S. REP.
No. 91-552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969); Thrower, Administrative Aspects of the
Tax Reform Act of 1969, 22 THE TAX EXECUTIVE 161, 162 (1970).
78 The sixteenth amendment states:
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes,
from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several
states, and without regard to any census or enumeration.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVL This amendment is a legislative reversal of Pollock v.
Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), which held that the recently
enacted federal income tax was not consistent with the proportionality requirement of
article I, section 9, clause 4 of the Constitution. B. BITTKER & L. STONE, supra note 3 1,
at 4-10.
79 Smith v. United States, 250 F. Supp. 803 (D.N.J. 1966), appeal dismissed, 377
F.2d 739 (3d Cir. 1967). Cf. Boylan v. United States, 310 F.2d 493 (9th Cir.), cert.




context are the tenth amendment" ° and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.81 The considerations under the fifth amendment are three-
fold: has the taxpayer received procedural due process;82 has the tax-
payer received substantive due process;8 3 and has the taxpayer enjoyed
the equal protection of the law.84 The question under the tenth amend-
ment is whether the federal government has impermissibly invaded a
state interest.8 5
A. Due Process and Equal Protection
Procedural due process presents two issues: whether the statute in
question was properly enacted and whether the government has "followed
the rules" in a particular taxpayer's case. 8 6 Neither issue is likely to be a
successful ground for contesting the marriage penalty. A challenge to the
formal validity of the IRC seems unreasonable, and the due process ob-
jections would not be directed toward the specific tax collection procedures
applied to one particular taxpayer.
Substantive due process raises more significant concerns, but is also an
insufficient ground for overturning the marriage penalty. Although the
boundaries of substantive due process are incapable of exact delineation,
the idea of fundamental fairness is often put forward.8 7 A taxation stat-
ute would be fundamentally unfair if it were confiscatory88 or lacked any
rational basis. 89 The marriage penalty is not so odious as to fail to pass
these tests. Another substantive due process formulation is that a statute
must not be "arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable." 90 The relevant con-
siderations are whether there is fair warning of the effect or requirements
of the law,91 whether the object of the law is permissible, 92 whether the
means chosen have a real and substantial relationship to the object,93
and whether the means are themselves reasonable. 4 These concerns are
SO The tenth amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states re-
spectively, or to the people." U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
81 The fifth amendment provides in part, "No person shall ... be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
82 See note 86 and accompanying text infra.
83 See notes 87-98 and accompanying text infra.
84 See notes 99-121 and accompanying text infra.
85 See part IV B infra.
86 Burton v. Platter, 53 F. 901, 904 (8th Cir. 1893).
87 Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930).
88 Morris Inv. Corp. v. Comm'r, 134 F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1943).
89 Quincy College & Seminary Corp. v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 328 F. Supp.
808 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
9 0 Lapides v. Clark, 176 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
91 Cf. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77 (1932). This
aspect arises most often in criminal cases; no claim of a lack of fair warning is
tenable for the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, a far from unknown even
if otherwise obscure source.
92 City of Atlanta v. National Bituminous Coal Comm'n, 26 F. Supp. 606 (D.D.C.),
aff'd sub nor. City of Atlanta v. Ickes 308 U.S. 517 (1939).
93 Lapides v. Clark, 176 F.2d 619 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 860 (1949).
94 Williamson v. Comm'r, 100 F.2d 735 (6th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 307 U.S. 623
(1939).
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more important when the challenged statute is regulatory rather than
revenue-raising.9 5 A true revenue-raising scheme has a permissible and
obvious connection between means and ends, and generally can be chal-
lenged only as providing insufficient warning
96 or as unreasonable.9 7
Although reasonable persons might differ on the merits of the marriage
penalty, it is difficult to say that it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreason-
able.98 Consequently, the marriage penalty aspect of the Internal Rev-
enue Code does not seem to violate substantive due process.
Equal protection of the laws, explicitly granted in the fourteenth
amendment, 99 is not specifically guaranteed by the fifth amendment, but
has been read into it as an aspect of substantive due process.9 0° Although
it is not clear whether the federal government should be held to a stricter,
identical, or more flexible standard than the states, the cases seem to apply
the same standards. 10' Equal protection analysis, as applied to the states,
involves a two-step process. First, the degree of judicial scrutiny is deter-
mined on the basis of whether or not the plaintiff is asserting a fundamen-
tal right or challenging a classification as suspect.'0 2 If the plaintiff does
not trigger strict judicial review by asserting a fundamental right 103 or
challenging a suspect classification,"" the court accords the state's action
a presumption of legitimacy, thereby placing the burden on the plaintiff to
show either that the discrimination lacks a reasonable basis or that the
means chosen have no rational relationship to a reasonable end. 0 5 This
task is difficult for a plaintiff, but not impossible.'0 6 If, on the other
9'See generally United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). See also United
States v. Hudson, 299 U.S. 498 (1937), which sustained retroactive taxation for
revenue.
96 With widespread publication and no restriction on short-term retroactivity, the
federal income tax seems immune to complaints of no warning.
9 7 See, e.g., Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U.S. 312 (1932), which struck down a rule
making all gifts completed during the last two years of a decendent's life gifts in
contemplation of death.
98 Faraco v. Comm'r, 261 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 925
(1959).
99 Section 1 of the fourteenth amendment provides in part, "No state shall . . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law." U.S. CONST.
amend XIV, § 1.
100 Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618
(1969).
101 No analytical distinction was drawn between Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954), and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), although Bolling was
decided under the fifth amendment and Brown was decided under the fourteenth
amendment.
10 2 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
See also Tussman & ten Broek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REV.
341 (1949); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
101 See notes 119-122 infra.
104 See notes 123-127 infra.
105 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
106 E.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). In Reed, Idaho was unable to show a
rational basis for distinguishing between males and females in making appointments
as administrators for the probate of intestate estates.
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hand, the plaintiff triggers strict review, the burden falls on the state to
show that it has a sufficiently compelling interest to justify denying this
plaintiff what would seem to be his deserved rights.""7 According to
Chief Justice Burger, no state has ever successfully made this showing.' 08
Since the result of a particular case will most often be determined by
the decision concerning the appropriate degree of review, rather than the
result of the review itself, attention has focused primarily upon which
rights and classifications trigger strict review. Fundamental rights seem to
include voting, °9 procreation,1 10 and travel,"' but not education.
1 1 2
Suspect classifications seem to include race,'" alienage, 1 4 ancestry, 1"5
and possibly sex" 6 and wealth." 7
It is unlikely that the federal government could show a compelling
interest to support the marriage penalty." 8 The question is whether there
is a basis for triggering strict review. It may be that marriage is a funda-
mental right. The Supreme Court struck down Virginia's antimiscegena-
tion statute in Loving v. Virginia,1 " and that case can be read to stand
for either or both of the following propositions: that racial classifications
are suspect or that marriage is a fundamental right. The former is patently
true and is sufficient to sustain the decision. The latter, however, is also
explicitly supported by the language of the case,' 20 and consequently,
until the Court clarifies this question, both propositions must be regarded
107 McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 806 (1969).
108 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 363-64 (1972) (Burger, J., dissenting).
109 E.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965).
110 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
111 E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
112 San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37 (1973).
113 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
114 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
115 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944).
116 Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). Mr. Justice Brennan, joined by
Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall, held that sex should be a suspect classification.
117 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353
(1963). In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, the Court noted that "Lines drawn on
the basis of wealth or property, like those of race are traditionally disfavored." Har-
per v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 668 (1966) (citation omitted). But
see James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971). Contra, San Antonio Independent School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
118 Indeed with simple alternatives available and a history of contrary practice,
the federal government is almost estopped from claiming a compelling interest in this
particular means of raising revenue.
119 388-U.S. 1 (1967).
120 The opinion states: "Marriage is one of the 'basic civil rights of man,' funda-
mental to our very existence and survival." 388 U.S. at 12. The Court went on to sug-
gest that "To deny this fundamental freedom... is surely to deprive ... citizens of
liberty without due process of law." Id. Although the Court simultaneously condemned
the racial restriction included in and implemented by the Virginia antimiscegenation
statute, it also tied together the threads of due process and equal protection. Con-
sequently, whether or not the implied federal guarantee of equal protection is
identical to the explicit guarantee in the fourteenth amendment, the federal guarantee,
resting as it does on a due process basis, should be read to include marriage as a funda-
mental right.
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as valid. 121 Therefore, while taxing schemes which discriminated against
single persons did not deny equal protection, the current scheme, which
discriminates against some married persons, arguably denies equal pro-
tection of the laws.
B. States' Rights
The fifth amendment guarantees of due process and implied equal pro-
tection 122 are not the only grounds upon which the constitutionality of
the present disparate rate treatment of married and single taxpayers might
be contested. The tenth amendment to the Constitution guarantees that
the soverign power of the states over matters reserved for their control
may not be abridged by federal action. 21" This division of sovereignty is
the essence of a federal system.
124
Under the tenth amendment, marriage is a legal relationship over which
the states have exclusive control. 1 25 The strength of the states' interest in
the unencumbered exercise of control over marriage is apparent from the
number of cases heard by the Supreme Court dealing with conflicts aris-
ing when two or more states apply their marriage and divorce laws to one
married couple.
1' 6
While the federal government is undoubtedly within the scope of its
express sixteenth amendment constitutional power in implementing an
income taxation system,127 it is also clear that the disincentives to mar-
riage inherent in the IRC's present allocation of tax burdens' 2t undercut,
to some extent, the states' power to determine marriage policy. Without
a sufficient basis in tax policy, the federal government's imposition of
higher tax rates on two-earner married couples represents an exercise of
what is, at best, only an implied power, secondary to the express taxing
power, and constitutes an effective, albeit partial, usurpation of the states'
constitutional power to control policy concerning marriage.
When the exercise of power by both states and federal governments
results in a conflict, the supremacy clause of the Constitution12 nor-
121 See also Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (dealing with the sterili-
zation of prisoners and, therefore, procreation); Griswold v. Connecticut. 381 U.S. 479
(1965) (sanctifying the right of privacy in the context of marriage); Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the abortion case). These cases indicate that governmental
restrictions on marriage in the traditional sense will be disfavored. That is not to say
that government encouragement of marriage will also be disfavored. See part IV B
infra.
122 See part IV A supra.
123 U.S. CONST. amend. X.
124 See generally A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS
ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 114-66 (3rd ed. 1963).
125 See, e.g., Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562 (1906); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 582 (1859).
126 See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 (1945); R. CRAMTON &
D. CURRIE, CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS, ch. 6 (1968).
127 See note 78 and accompanying text supra.
128 See Figures 1 and 2 supra.
129 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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mally dictates that the state interest give way and the federal interest
take precedence. °3 0 In cases involving conflicts between implied con-
gressional powers and the powers reserved to the states by the tenth
amendment, however, the supremacy clause is not immediately invoked.
A more flexible standard, first stated in McCulloch v. Maryland,13' is
employed as an interpretive application of the necessary and proper
clause, 132 a fertile source of implied powers.
Such a conflict between the express taxation power of Congress and a
power reserved to the states by the tenth amendment was considered by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler.1:*:  The receiver for a
Massachusetts cotton mill attacked the constitutionality of taxes assessed
against the mill under the Agriculural Adjustment Act (AAA) of 1933.
These taxes were to be used as crop-reduction subsidies paid to cotton
growers under individual acreage-reduction contracts between the growers
and the Secretary of Agriculture.
The Court held that the standing requirements of Maysachusetts v.
Mellonl.*4 were not a bar to suit by the taxpayer since the tax was being
resisted as an unauthorized means of regulating agricultural production,
not as a source of unauthorized expenditures. While Mr. Justice Roberts.
writing for the Court, recognized that taxation solely for the purpose of
raising revenue to "provide for the general welfare" is normally granted a
presumption of constitutionality,':'1 the mandate of the Child Labor Tax
case,' :' 6 which requires that nonfiscal taxation motives be examined, was
followed, and the Court found that regulation, rather than revenue-
raising, was the underlying purpose of the tax.
The Agricultural Adjustment Act invades the reserved rights
of the states. It is a statutory plan to regulate and control agri-
cultural production, a matter beyond the powers delegated to
the federal government.
The power of taxation, which is expressly granted, may, of
course, be adopted as a means to carry into operation another
power also expressly granted. But resort to the taxing power to
130 See e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
131 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The Court said:
Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution,
and all ineans which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional.
Id. at 421 (emphasis added).
132 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
133 297 U.S. 1 (1935).
134 262 U.S. 447 (1923). In that case, the Court held that individual taxpayers
may not question federal expenditures on the ground that the alleged unlawful ex-
penditures deplete the treasury and thus increase future taxation.
':I-, See J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States. 276 U.S. 394 (1927).
136 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
SPING 1974]
Journal of Law Reform
effectuate an end which is not legitimate, not within the scope
of the Constitution, is obviously inadmissible. 1 37
Congress has never expressly communicated a desire to regulate mar-
riage through implementation of the tax laws, yet the result of the present
individual tax system is the "marriage penalty" previously described. The
alternatives to a judicial finding that Congress is using the income tax as
a means of eliciting desired action in the area of marriage policy are the
following: that the congressional policy behind differential taxation was
equality, in which case Congress has failed to effectuate its policy goal; or
that Congress had no policy at all, in which case the marriage penalty must
fall to the equal protection challenge, which requires a compelling govern-
mental interest. Under any of these views, the marriage penalty should
not be allowed to continue. In addition, other cases appear to direct the
courts to a finding that the present tax rate structures of the IRC are
unconstitutional.
In Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,"8 Tank Truck Rentals
was attempting to deduct fines imposed on its trucks and drivers for viola-
tion of state maximum weight laws as "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses of operating a trucking business under section 162(a) of the
Internal Revenue Code.' 39 The Court held that strict adherence to the
meaning of section 162(a)'s deductibility guidelines would dictate allow-
ance of the deduction, but that federal tax statutes should not be used as
a means of frustrating an express state policy concerning highway safety.
Given the choice between partially frustrating the goals of the federal tax
statute in question and completely frustrating the state's goals, the Court
chose the former. This same reasoning can be applied to the conflict
between goals and means involved in the present allocation of tax bur-
dens.
The end sought by federal income taxation is revenue collec-
tion. 140 While raising revenue is an important function of the federal
government and one expressly authorized by the Constitution, the means
used to attain thi3 valid end clearly infringe on the power of a state to
control the institution of marriage. The federal goal of raising and collect-
ing revenue need not frustrate the states' promarriage policies,'
4 ' but the
137 297 U.S. 1, 68-69 (1922). While the role of Butler in the Court packing attempt
of 1937 and the subsequent congressional enactment of most of the provisions of the
AAA minus the processing tax have caused doubt as to the validity of the holding in
Butler, the case has never been overruled and no attempt has been made to levy a
similar tax.
138 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
139 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 162(a).
140 See generally J. PECHMAN, supra note 12, at 1.
141 The courts of various states have recognized marriage as a valuable social
institution and have granted it a favored status under the law. See, e.g., Sanders v.
Sanders, 52 Ariz. 156, 171, 79 P.2d 523, 529 (1938); Dunham v. Dunham, 162 Ill.
589, 607, 44 N.E. 841, 847 (1896); Jones v. Jones, 63 Okla. 208, 210, 164 P. 463, 464
(1917); Gress v. Gress, 209 S.W.2d 1003 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948).
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means presently used by the federal government to assess and collect
individual taxes do frustrate state aims 142 and, therefore, are not "appro-
priate" even if "plainly adapted" to raising revenue.
Although the Court has recognized that federal overstepping into an
area normally reserved for state control may be constitutionally upheld if
a proper governmental objective may only be implemented thereby,143
it has been adamant in maintaining that federal control over areas re-
served for state regulation may not be achieved by means of an author-
ized action which sweeps unnecessarily broadly.144
In Aptheker v. Secretary of State,14 ' the Court held that a statutory
restriction upon the right of registered Communists to obtain passports
was an overbroad application of the congressional right to protect national
security. Such a restriction infringed upon the right of American cit-
izens to travel, 146 and, absent a showing that Congress had no other
means of protecting national security from the damaging impact of espi-
onage, the Court held that the rights of citizens far outweighed the con-
gressional goal. Since other, less restrictive means of protecting national
security were available to Congress, the statute was held unconstitutional.
While Aptheker dealt with a claim of denial of due process to individ-
uals, the same reasoning should apply to a federal statute which, in its
sweep, subjugates an exclusive state power. When subjected to the strin-
gent test of overbreadth of scope, it i3 apparent that the congressional
goals of raising revenue and providing equality of treatment for all mar-
ried taxpayers in all states could be attained by means that do not under-
cut the promarriage policies of the states.
State courts have also stated that marriage is of vital interest to society and to the
states. See, e.g., Sweigert v. State, 213 Ind. 157, 165, 12 N.E.2d 134, 138 (1938);
French v. McAnarney, 290 Mass. 544, 546, 195 N.E. 714, 715 (1935); Fearon v.
Treanor, 272 N.Y. 2,68, 271-72, 5 N.E.2d 815, 816 (1936); Holloway v. Halloway,
130 Ohio St. 214, 216, 198 N.E. 579, 580 (1935).
The favored status of marriage in the states is also indicated by the relative ease
with which a valid marriage can be entered into and by the statutory obstacles to
terminating marriage by divorce. For example, Illinois imposes no waiting period
on two residents who apply for a marriage license after having submitted to a blood
test. (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 89, §§ 6, 6a (Smith-Hurd 1966)). However, a divorce can be
obtained only after showing cause (ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § I (Smith-Hurd 1956))
and only after six inenths continuous residence by one party within the state. (ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 3 (Smith-Hurd 1956)). For comparisons of the state statutory
regulations governing marriage and divorce in all 50 states see 19 THE BOOK OF
THE STATES-1972-73, at 409-11 (1972).
The states' preference for legally sanctioned marriage relations rather than for
more informal relationships between couples is indicated by the fact that all states
make provision for formalized marriage, while only 14 states recognize the validity
of common law marriages. See 19 THE BOOK OF THE STATES-I 972-73, at 409 (1972).
142 See notes 13, i41 and accompanying text supra.
143 See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
144 See, e.g., Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Kent v. Dulles,
357 U.S. 116 (1958).
143 378 U.S. 500 t1964).
146 Id. at 504.
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V. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
While a taxation system that allocates tax burdens among individuals
in accordance with the congressional goals of equal taxation of equal in-
come 147 and taxation by ability to pay148 could be achieved by retain-
ing the current four-tiered rate structure modified by further rate con-
cessions, the resulting system might well be unmanageable because of the
multiplicity of rate treatments. A simpler and more desirable solution
would be for Congress to discard the present multiple rates in favor of
one universal rate. 149 Equity and rationality in individual taxation could
be achieved through rate equalization and the use of mandatory joint
returns for married couples 150 or alternatively through individual taxation
of persons according to their exercise of management and control over
income or income-producing property. 151
Unfortunately, experience indicates that neither of these proposals is
likely to be enacted. 152 Twenty-five years under income-splitting and the
long-standing vested interest of sole-earner married individuals, who bene-
fit most from the status quo, militate against passage of any proposal for
change. In addition, any reform that eliminated income-splitting in com-
munity property states would surely be constitutionally challenged if
adopted. 153 Nevertheless, equity and rationality in the tax system could
be restored without incurring the stigma of historical unpopulariy re-
flected by the mandatory joint return and "management and control"
plans, or denying income-splitting to community property married couples
by moving to a dual-rate system.
54
147 H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1969).
148 See note 67 supra.
149 Use of only one rate would return the individual tax system to pre-income-
splitting simplicity, but would force a congressional decision on the proper tax units
to use for assessment of tax. See generally H. GROVES, supra note 38, at 69-77;
Hearings on American Families: Trends & Pressures Before the Subcomm. on Children
and Youth of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
- (1973) (testimony of Harvey Brazer).
150 See note 33 supra.
151 See note 33 supra.
152 See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
153 While the Supreme Court has not ruled on the constitutionality of denial of the
use of income-splitting to married taxpayers in community property states in the
income tax context, the question of the constitutionality of denial of the use of
income-splitting through the estate and gift tax has been addressed by the Court. In
Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945), the Court made it clear that Congress
was not bound by the limits of a state's property laws in determining ownership for
the purpose of taxation. Since Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930), was decided on
the basis of statutory interpretation and not constitutional grounds, it should not bar
legislative repeal of the use of the preference.
For a prior Attorney General's view of the constitutionality of tax treatment con-
trary to community property income division see 61 CONG. REc. 5909-22 (1921).
See also INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1402(a)(5)(B) (denies split-income treatment on
partnership income and requires that all such income be considered self-employment
income of the partner who earned it).
154 Use of a dual-rate system to equalize tax burdens between married couples
from community property states and all other taxpayers was often discussed informally
in Congress prior to 1947. Tax Treatment of Family Income, supra note 33, at 846,
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The proposed dual-rate system would use one rate schedule for single
taxpayers and married couples who aggregate their income and file joint
returns, and another for married persons who file separately after split-
ting marital income. Married persons who wished to continue splitting
their income would be able to do so, but their split income would be
taxed at the rate for married persons filing separately. This rate schedule
would have brackets half as wide, and therefore -twice as progressive, as
the regular schedule. Since the effect of splitting income between spouses
is to double the width of the tax rate brackets applied to the split-in-
come, the total impact of using the special rate schedule for split-income
returns would be neutralization of the advantage of income-splitting.151
A dual-rate schedule would completely eliminate the rate reduction
advanage of income-splitting for married couples and would result in
equal rates for all tax units with equal taxable income, regardless of
marital status. Rate equalization coupled with a retention of present
exemptions and deductions would impose tax burdens much more nearly
in conformity with the policy of taxation according to ability to pay. If
854. A specific proposal for equalization of taxation by the use of a dual-rate scheme
was offered by William Vickrey in 1947. W. VICKREY, AGENDA FOR PROGRESSIVE
TAXATION 274-87 (1947). The dual-rate system has been proposed as a solution to the
post-1948 inequity problem by several authors. See, e.g., Pechman, supra note 68,
at 483-86; P. STERN, supra note 1, at 128-30.
155 The following is a simple hypothetical application of the dual-rate system:
SCHEDULE A




$1000-4000 $150 + 20% of excess over $1000
$4000-8000 $750 + 25% of excess over $4000
$8000-12000 $1750 + 30% of excess over $8000
SCHEDULE B




$500-2000 $75 + 20% of excess over $500
$2000-4000 $375 + 25% of excess over $2000
$4000-6000 $875 + 30% of excess over $4000
The consequence of using a schedule with brackets half as wide as the normal
brackets for those who split income is that the bracket-doubling effect of income-
splitting is exactly neutralized and all equal-income taxpayers pay at equal rates.
For example, a single person with $10,000 taxable income will pay $1,750 + (2,000 x
.30) = $2,350 in tax. A married couple with $10,000 total taxable income will pay
a) $1,750 + (2,000 x .30) = $2,350 total tax if they file jointly; or b) $875 +
(1,000 x .30) = $1,175 x 2 = $2,350 total tax if they split income and file separate
returns.
Exemptions and deductions can be used to make whatever adjustments are ap-
propriate to compensate for the extra expenses incurred and for the value of the labor
at home, i.e. the imputed income lost when the second spouse goes to work. See note 68
supra.
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all other factors were equal, a single person with only one exemption
would pay a tax higher than either a single person who supports a depen-
dent or a married couple with two personal exemptions.
This allocation of tax burdens coincides with ranking according to abil-
ity to pay as suggested by Pechman, 56 Groves, 157 Oldman and Tem-
ple, 158 and Richards.15 9 However, all of these commentators state that
a strong case can be made for granting some concession to two-earner
families because of the extra work-related expenses incurred and the tax-
free imputed income due to a stay-at-home spouse's home labors that is
lost when a second family member goes to work outside the home. 60
The concession most often proposed is an earned-income allowance.
1 6'
Adoption of a percentage-of-income earned-income allowance, available
only to the second earner in a family with a specific ceiling limiting any sig-
nificant tax reduction impact to families with low- and moderate-incomes,
would yield a result consistent with the policy of taxing in accordance
with the taxpayer's ability to pay.
The tax system resulting from enactment of a rate-equalizing dual-rate
plan with an earned income concession for two-earner married couples
would be more nearly marriage-neutral than the current system and
would also remedy any constitutional defects. The improvement in tax
policy alone is sufficiently desirable to commend this reform to Congress,
even in the absence of actual litigation presenting a constitutional chal-
lenge to the present rate structure.
VI. CONCLUSION
Present taxpayer dissatisfaction with governmental allocation of income
tax burdens is the product of political, legal, and historical factors, but
analysis of these factors indicates that there is considerable doubt that
Congress intended to alter the distribution of tax burdens in the manner
which has ultimately resulted. Significant evidence shows that the present
system does not impose tax burdens in accordance with the express con-
gressional desire to tax according to ability to pay, and there is some ques-
tion about the constitutionality of the present rate system.
156 Pechman, supra note 68, at 480-81.
157 H. GROVES, supra note 38, at 56-83.
158 Oldman & Temple, supra note 75, at 603-04.
159 Richards, Discrimination Against Married Couples in the Present Income Tax
Laws, supra note 2, at 530-34.
160 See note 68 and accompanying text supra.
161 An earned-income allowance is a deduction which grants a taxpayer an ex-
emption from income for some of the work-related expenses incurred in the production
of income. Several foreign countries grant earned-income allowances in lieu of or
in addition to standard deductions from income. See generally Oldman & Temple,
supra note 75, at 586-96, 604. The United States gave a special $15 tax credit to
working wives in 1944-45, which was in essence an earned-income allowance for a
second worker in a family. J. PECHMAN, supra note 12, at 92-93. For a further
explanation and rationalization of the need for an earned income allowance for work-
ing wives see Blumberg, supra note 13, at 59-62.
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For these reasons, it is imperative that Congress review its income tax
goals and policies and enact a new individual tax system that no longer
arbitrarily differentiates between -taxpayer units on the basis of marital
and household status.
A tax system imposing equal taxation on all taxation units with equal
taxable income and differentiating between taxpayer units with the same
adjusted gross income solely through the availability and use of personal
exemptions, dependency deductions, an earned income allowance, and
other realistic expense allowances would create a tax system which comes
much closer to the goal of equitable treatment of all taxpayers. For that
reason, this proposal should be considered and quickly enacted by Con-
gress to end tax discrimination against one group or another.
-Michael W. Betz
